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Stepto: Recent Developments under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamat

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE SURFACE
MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF
1977
The body of case law' construing the regulatory scheme of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 19772 continues to expand. During
1982, courts considered venue, jurisdiction and constitutional issues, the prime
farmland grandfather exemption and "second mining." This article examines
the courts' continuing attempts to achieve the Act's purpose of "establishing a
nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse
effects of surface coal mining operations." s
I.

PREPAYMENT

Considering an important constitutional issue, several United States District Courts upheld the constitutionality of the prepayment provision of section 518(c) 4 of the Act.
In the first case, United States v. Hill,5 a partnership, Hill Construction
Company, was issued a notice of violation for nine violations of the Act and its
regulations. A date was set for abatement and a notice of proposed assessment
of civil penalty followed. After the company failed to request administrative
review, a final order was issued. The company failed to pay the civil penalty.
A cessation order seeking the discontinuance of all active off-permit mining was issued. Again, the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) proposed a civil
penalty and Hill Construction failed to request an informal conference or formal hearing. The penalty became final and Hill again refused to pay the fine. A
third notice of violation was issued and the company responded in a sir1ar
manner.
The government filed an action in the Eastern District of Tennessee to
collect the penalties. It successfully argued that Hill's failure to invoke any of
the available administrative remedies and particularly its failure to abide by
the prepayment provisions of section 518(c) 6 "results in a waiver of all legal
I This article reviews only cases decided under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act [hereinafter "the Act"]. No attempt has been made to review or incorporate changes in the
Act's regulations (see 30 C.F.R. chapter VII) especially in view of the substantial number of proposed revisions. See Proposed Revisions to the Permanent Program Regulations Implementing
Section 501(b) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, U.S. Dept. of the
Interior, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Volume III: Draft Final Regulations, January, 1983.
'

'

30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (Supp. IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. IV 1980).

4 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (Supp. IV 1980). The section requires the prepayment into an escrow
account the amount of the assessment before final administrative review begins.
' 533 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
0 That subsection provides in relevant part:
Upon the issuance of a notice or order charging that a violation of the chapter has occurred, the Secretary shall inform the operator within thirty days of the proposed
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rights to contest the violation or the amount of the penalty," 7 thereby entitling
the government to summary judgment.
The company contended that the Act violated its constitutional equal protection rights under the fifth amendment.' The Act regulates a class of persons
composed of coal mine operators, Hill argued, while exempting other types of
mining operations from regulation. Furthermore, it contended, there can be no
rational basis for such a classification.
Citing Hodel v. Indiana and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and ReclamationAssociation,10 the court dismissed that argument, saying that it could
not say that Congress was without a rational basis for regulating surface mine
coal operators while not similarly regulating other types of mining operations.
Hill Construction's second argument was that section 518(c), which requires payment of proposed civil penalties as a condition to an administrative
hearing and which includes an automatic waiver of all legal rights, violated its
procedural due process rights. In reviewing administrative remedies available
1" the court concluded
to the company,
that procedural due process was not
12
offended.

amount of said penalty. The person charged with the penalty shall then have thirty days
to pay the proposed penalty in full or, if the person wished to contest either the amount
of the penalty or the fact of the violation, forward the proposed amount to the Secretary
for placement in an escrow account. Failure to forward the money to the Secretary
within thirty days shall result in a waiver of all legal rights to contest the violation or the
amount of the penalty.
30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
7

Id. at 813.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

8

U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

9 452 U.S. 314 (1981). The court in Hill found that the Supreme Court in Hodel v. Indiana
disposed of an equal protection argument concerning prime farmland provisions of the Act. The
Court found that "social and economic legislation like the Surface Mining Act that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must be upheld against equal protection attack when the legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose
....
Moreover, such legislation carries with it a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality. . . . "Id. at 331.
10 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The court in Hill also found that the Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia had ruled that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that coal surface mining has a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.
11Administrative remedies include: The submission of pertinent material to the Office of Surface Mining to be considered by the assessment office, 30 C.F.R. § 723.16(a)(1982); an administrative hearing without any prepayment, 43 C.F.R. § 4.1160 (1982); an informal conference to review
the amount of the penalty, 30 C.F.R. § 723.17(a)(1982); an informal public hearing in the case of a
cessation order, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(5)(Supp. IV 1980), 30 C.F.R. § 722.15 (1982); and formal review of the validity of the citation and the amount of the proposed penalty, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c)
(Supp.
1980), 30 C.F.R. § 723.18 (1982); 43 C.F.R. § 4.1150 (1982).
1Is 533
F. Supp. at 815.
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Hill's third argument was that the cessation order13 constituted a taking of
private property without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment." Again citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,15 the court noted that the Supreme Court has held that the Surface
Mining Act easily survives a facial challenge on the fifth amendment "taking"
question due to the "mere enactment" of the Act.18 However, the Supreme
Court had specifically reserved a ruling on the "taking" issue if presented with
reference to particular parcels of land.17
The company contended that the order to cease operations "without a
hearing and without providing for any compensation"1 8 violates the fifth
amendment. Noting that the Supreme Court 9 does not require a hearing
before the issuance of a cessation order, the court rejected the company's argument, saying, "the order did not require permanent cessation of mining but
instead required only the cessation of mining operations until such time as
disturbances created outside the permit area could be corrected. ' 20 The company's failure to attempt any administrative resolution, coupled with the temporary nature of the mining permit's suspension, led the court to conclude that
any deprivation of property
rights was not so severe as to constitute a fifth
21
amendment "taking."
In a second case, Blackhawk Mining Co. v. Watt,22 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky rejected another contention
that section 518(c) of the Act violates rights to due process. Additionally, the
court rejected the company's argument that section 518(b) 21 entitled it to a
hearing even if it had not complied with the prepayment provisions of section
518(c).

23

'

Looking to the language of subsection (c), the judge noted that the

hearing allowed under subsection (b) is one of the "legal rights" provided for in
subsection (c). Subsection (c) states that "failure to forward the money to the
Secretary within thirty days shall result in a waiver of all legal rights to contest
the violation or the amount of the penalty." Subsection (b), the court reasoned,
"refers to the final imposition of a civil penalty which, of course, cannot be
23
imposed until after the operator has had an opportunity for a hearing. 1
That hearing is guaranteed by prepayment of the penalty under section 518(c).
Other district courts have also rejected attacks on the constitutionality of

13

See 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) (describing procedures for a cessation order).

Id.
15 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
1 533 F. Supp. at 816 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295-96).
17 452 U.S. at 297, n.40.
18533 F. Supp. at 816.
19 452 U.S. at 297-304.
20 533 F. Supp. at 816.
14

21
22

Id.
No. 79-136 (E.D. Ky., Feb. 11, 1982) (unreported).

30 U.S.c. § 1268(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
21 No. 79-136.
23

23.2

Id.
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section 518(c); case citations are set out in the notes.2
II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

A. Holmes Limestone
Of the three noteworthy cases in this area, the most important is the de-

nial of certiorari in Watt v. Holmes Limestone Co.2 5

In Holmes, the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Ohio had dismissed a complaint2" for lack of jurisdiction, holding section
526(a)(1) of the Act 27 permits challenges to the regulation involved to be

brought only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.2"
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for
consideration of the merits,29 holding that section 526(a) (1) permits review of
challenges to national regulations in courts other than the United States Dis-

trict Court for the District of Columbia. It reasoned that, while the statute
provides that certain actions may be brought only in the district court where

the mining operation is located, the final version of the bill deleted the word

"only" from the phrase providing for judicial review of national regulations in

the District of Columbia."0 Therefore, it concluded, if Congress had desired to
limit jurisdiction to the District of Columbia, it would never have deleted the
214United States v. Thompson Bros. Coal Co., 532 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Winston
Ford Co., Inc. v. Watt, CIV 80-10, E.D. Ky. (March 31, 1982) (unreported); Eldorado Coal Co. v.
Watt, CIV 80-07, E.D. Ky. (April 7, 1982) (unreported); B & M Coal Corp. v. Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, 531 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Ind. 1982); United States v. Log
Mountain Mining Co., 550 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Big Delta Minerals v. Watt, No. 800041-0(G) (W.D. Ky., Nov. 8, 1982) (unreported); United States v. Missouri Mining, Inc., Nos. 806092-CV-SJ & 81-6068-CV-SJ (W.D. Missouri, Oct. 5, 1982) (unreported).
25 102 S. Ct. 2280 (1982).
26 655 F.2d at 733. The action was brought by Holmes Limestone Co. as a challenge to the
validity of a regulation defining the term "cemetery" as used in § 522(e)(5) of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
2' 30 U.S.C. 1276(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
Any action of the Secretary to approve or disapprove a State program or to prepare
or promulgate a Federal program pursuant to this chapter shall be subject to judicial
review by the United States District Court for the District which includes the capital of
the State whose program is at issue. Any action by the Secretary promulgating national
rules or regulations including standards pursuant to sections 1251, 1265, 1266, and 1273
of this title shall be subject to judicial review in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Any other action constituting rulemaking by the Secretary
shall be subject to judicial review only by the United States District Court for the District in which the surface coal mining operation is located. Any action subject to judicial
review under this subsection shall be affirmed unless the court concludes that such action is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law. A petition for review of
any action subject to judicial review under this subsection shall be filed in the appropriate Court within sixty days from the date of such action, or after such date if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after the sixtieth day. Any such petition may be
made by any person who participated in the administrative proceedings and who is aggrieved by the action of the Secretary.
28 Id.
29 Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981).
30 Id. at 737.
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word "only" from the bill. 1
Justices White and Blackmun, dissenting from the denial of certiorari,"2
found the decision below troubling for several reasons. First, they contended
that the court of appeals arguably frustrated Congress' carefully devised plan
for judicial review by allowing a national regulation to be challenged in federal
courts other than those in the District of Columbia. The dissenters pointed to
the language of section 526(a)(1), which provides that regulations with a national impact be reviewed in the District of Columbia, those with a state-wide
impact in the district court for the district of the capital of the state involved,
only in the district where the surface mining operaand all other regulations
33
tion at issue is located.
Secondly, the dissenters took issue with the lower court's reliance on the
omission of the word "only" from the final version of the bill reported out of
the Conference Committee. They noted that the committee's discussion of the
not even mention the deletion and, therefore, it
changes made in the bill does
34
may have been inadvertent.

Finally, Justices White and Blackmun noted that the only other courts to
rule on the question have both held that section 526(a)(1) provides for exclusive review of national regulations in the District Court for the District of
Columbia."

Concluding that the court of appeals' questionable interpretation conflicts
with congressional intent that there be uniform national performance standards for surface mining, the dissenters advocated granting the petition for
certiorari and would have set the case for oral argument.36 A delay in the resolution of the issue, the justices warned, could cause substantial disruption in
and to the agencies charged with administering the
the coal mining industry
37
Surface Mining Act.

B. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc.
Two actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by two Appalachian-based nonprofit environmentalist organizations, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. (SOCM) and the Council
of Southern Mountains, Inc.
In the first case, s decided in July, 1982, the environmentalists had complained that the Secretary of the Interior failed to inspect and enforce against
31 Id.

312102 S. Ct. at 2281.
33 Id.
34 Id.

35Id. See Reading Anthracite v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement, No.
80-0667 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 8, 1980), and Union Carbide Corp. v. Andrus, 13 E.R.C. 1481, 1489 (S.D.
W. Va. 1979).
30 102 S. Ct. at 2282.
37 Id.

3" Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Watt, No. 81-2238 (D.D.C. July 8, 1982)
(unreported).
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mining and reclamation operations alleged to be in excess of two acres. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the Secretary had failed to collect monies
that mining operators owed to the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund. Finding that venue in the District of Columbia was improper under section 520(c)""
of the Act, the complaints were dismissed. Judge Charles Richey held that individual lawsuits should be brought in the district where the particular mining
operation involved is located, because "the particular facts of each mining or
reclamation operation might dictate a different result in each instance."4
In September, another case that had been filed by SOCM was decided in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 4 1 Plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) and the Director of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement (OSM), claiming that Department of Interior officials had failed
to assess and collect mandatory 2 civil penalties and had failed to take appropriate enforcement actions against surface coal mine operators who had been
found in violation of the Surface Mining Act.
Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that venue was improper,
noting that the violative surface mining operations were located within the Appalachian region and not within the District of Columbia. 43 The court, in ruling
that venue was properly in the District of Columbia, first noted that section
520(c) is a venue, not a jurisdictional provision. 44 Thus, it relates solely to the
convenience of the litigants.
Reasoning that the plaintiffs were challenging the Secretary's decision not
to assess penalties under section 518(h) 44" 1 and that his decision was nationwide in scope since it affected 700 or more violations, the court held that it
would not be more convenient to any party if plaintiffs were required to refile
the suit in Virginia, Kentucky or elsewhere. "The challenged action took place
here in Washington, D.C., and
affects surface coal mines throughout the
45
United States," the court said.

Additionally, Judge Barrington D. Parker found that section 520(c) refers
to actions involving only individual coal mines. In this case, plaintiffs had challenged a purported national policy under the4 Act, not 700 individual decisions
involving particular coal mining operations.
Finally, a footnote by the court distinguished the earlier SOCM decision,
which had ruled that venue was improper. 47 In contrast with the July ruling,
3' 30

U.S.C. § 1270(c) (Supp. 1I 1979).

4oNo. 81-2238.

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Watt, 550 F. Supp. 979 (D.C. 1982).
For discussion on the issue of whether the Secretary of the Interior has a mandatory or
discretionary duty to assess penalties for a cessation order, see text accompanying notes 174-190.
41550 F. Supp. at 980.
41

42

44 Id.
44.-1 30

U.S.C. § 1268(h) (Supp. IV 1980).

41 550 F. Supp. at 980-81.
46 Id. at 981.

"I Id. at 981, n.1.
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the court noted the facts of each violation in this case were not relevant. Here
the court was concerned with the nature of the Secretary's duty, not with the
conditions at each of the operations collectively. In December, Judge Parker
denied the government's motion for reconsideration of the September
opinion.8

III. PRIME FARMLAND GRANDFATHER EXEMPTION
Prime farmland, which reportedly covers 380 million acres, is land historically used for intensive agricultural purposes. Some of this land overlaps coal
reserves.4s'1 After stringent standards were promulgated in the Act' 2= to deal
with mining on such lands, an amendment 48 -3 was added which included a
grandfather clause exempting48"existing
surface mining operations" from those
4
more stringent requirements.

.

In July, an April 13, 1983 cut-off date for the prime farmland grandfather
exemption 9 was announced.5 0 In September, Judge Thomas Flannery of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the cut-off date was
"arbitrary and capricious," 51 declared it void and enjoined the Secretary from
52
implementing the pertinent sections.
3
On December 3, 1982, Judge Flannery issued a memorandum opinion5
pursuant to his initial order. One of the issues he addressed in the memorandum opinion was the cutoff date.
When the termination date was promulgated, the plaintiff, Peabody Coal
Co., had filed a complaint contending the regulation was arbitrary and capricious and that it was inconsistent with the language of section 510(d)(2) 53 1' and
with the legislative history of the grandfather clause. The judge agreed with
plaintiffs' arguments.
Judge Flannery considered the legislative history of the exemption and
found no basis for a temporal limitation on the section 510(d)(2) grandfather
exemption. The statute's references to revisions and renewals of permits, he
said, "plainly and unequivocally suggest that prior permits subject to pre-Act
requirements, as well as their continuation over time within the same geographic boundaries, remain grandfathered." 5'

Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Watt, No. 81-2134 (D.D.C., Dec. 28, 1982).
30 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. IV 1980).
430 U.S.C. § 1260(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
41- 123 Cong. Rec. 15, 236 (May 18, 1977).
4
J. Conlon, PrimeFarmlandExemptions Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 3 EASTERN M.L. INST. 6-1 (1982).
48

4-2

49

Id.

50 30

C.F.R. § 385.17(a)(5), announced in 47 Fed. Reg. 32939 (July 30, 1982).
51Peabody v. Watt, No. 81-645, 81-693, 81-2875, & 81-708 (D.D.C., Sept. 10, 1982).
52 30 U.S.C. § 1260(d), 30 C.F.R. 716.7(a)(2)(iv) and 30 C.F.R. 785.17(a)(5) (1982).
53Peabody Coal Co. v. Watt, No. 81-645, 81-693, 81-2875 & 81-708 (D.D.C., Dec. 3, 1982) (to
be published).
8-1 30 U.S.C. § 1260(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
5

Id.
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The judge also noted that the preamble accompanying the cut-off date's
promulgation 5did not mention the statutory language or the legislative history
to support it."

Other arguments in support of the cut-off date also were rejected. The
first was a Senate vote in 1980 to impose a 1982 cut-off date for the grandfather exemption under section 2112. The deletion of the amendment, the judge
found, "more clearly indicates that Congress recognized that a statutory
amendment was necessary to alter the grandfather provision." Additionally,
the court held an earlier court of appeals ruling, rejecting the original regulations because they lacked uniformity, was not grounds to uphold the April 3,
1983 cut-off date, which complied with that ruling. That holding could not be
read to require that grandfather rights terminate everywhere on April 3, 1983.
Finally, a third argument was dismissed. The Secretary contended that
since all operators must obtain new permits under a state's permanent program, all permits obtained under prior state law terminate automatically upon
the effective date of the state's permanent regulatory program. Noting that
this argument had not been raised before by the Secretary, Judge Flannery
found that the Secretary "has always agreed that the grandfather exemption
remains after the permanent program is in effect." 56
In addition to the cut-off date, the memorandum opinion addressed
Peabody's challenge to the adoption of regulations 1 limiting the grandfather
exemption for existing surface mines on prime farmland to those on lands
which the permittee had "a legal right to mine"5 8 prior to Aug. 3, 1977. Judge
Flannery framed the fundamental issue as whether the Section 510(d)(2) prime
farmland grandfather exemption allows mines to "expand beyond the boundaries of any pre-Act permit (without meeting the special prime farmlands standards) and, if so, how extensive an "expansion is permitted by statute."59' A
United States Court of Appeals decision, In Re Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation," had not addressed the issue, although the District of Columbia
Circuit had held that section 510(d)(2) "did exempt some land not covered by
the initial permit." The Peabody issue, the judge said, instead dealt with "the
extent of lands not covered by a pre-enactment permit or any extension or
revision thereof, which are nevertheless exempt as 'existing surface mining
operations.'

"61

The regulationsO interpret the grandfather exemption as limited to permittees with a "legal right to mine" prior to Aug. 3, 1977 "through ownership,
" 47 Fed. Reg. 32940-41 (1982).

"Peabody Coal.
'7

46 Fed. Reg. 7894 (Jan. 23, 1981).

30 C.F.R. § 785.17(a)(3)(ii) and 30 C.F.R. § 716.7(a)(2)(iii)(B) (1982).
"Peabody Coal.
627 F.2d 1346, 1360-63 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
61 See generally J. MacLeod & T. Means, When It Is Suitable to Be Unsuitable:An Analysis
of the Exemptions From the Surface Mining Act's Prohibitionson Mining, 3 EASTERN M.L. INST.
7-1, 7-7, 7-8 (1982).
11 46 Fed. Reg. 7894 (Jan. 23, 1981).
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contract, or lease but not including an option to buy, lease, or contract."
Peabody challenged the regulations, saying that although "some area limits on
the extemption are permissible, the geographic limits of each mine must be
established by examining the prior investments, purchasing policies, mining
mechanics, and other indications of operator intent to mine such an area."
Peabody also claimed the regulations were contrary to the Act's legislative
history.
The judge rejected both arguments. He said that since states used various
schedules for renewing or issuing new permits, the grandfather exemption
should be extended not only to mines holding permits as of August 3, 1979 and
to revisions or renewals of those permits, but also to "any existing surface mining operations for which a permit was issued prior to August 3, 1977." Additionally, Congress intended that the exemption apply only to acreage and time
beyond that specified in the permits or revisions
that do "in fact" constitute a
3
continuing operation of an ongoing mine.
Judge Flannery ruled that the scope of the exemption should be limited to
areas that can be characterized as a presently operating mine. Also, the exemption must be expanded beyond permit boundaries to level the effects of the Act
across states to achieve section 510(d)(2)'s purpose of providing uniformity of
exemption.
Peabody next argued that "effective control" of coal property, not the "legal right to mine," should be used to determine what is an "existing mine."
Peabody asserted that "industry practice with respect to surface mining investment and land procurement constitutes an appropriate standard by which to
construe 'existing surface mine operations' under section 510(d) (2)." The judge
rejected this "industry proposal," deferring instead to the judgment of the Secretary, who had considered but rejected the proposal.
IV.

DESIGNATED WILDERNESS AREAS

In Otter Creek Coal Co. v. United States,64 a coal company whose mineral
estate lay under the Otter Creek Wilderness Area 5 in West Virginia sought
compensation for deprivation of use of its property6 in the United States
Court of Claims. The judge ruled that, before its claim could be considered, the
67
company was required to seek a determination of its "valid existing rights"
68
6
under section 522(e) of the Act to mine within the wilderness area.
Thus, if Otter Creek was barred from creating surface disturbances within
the wilderness area and if the reserves could not be mined from areas outside
627 F.2d at 1361 (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 12,442 (daily ed. July 20, 1977)).
64 Ct. Cl. No. 83-79L (June 24, 1982) (unreported).
63

'5 The area was made part of the National Wilderness Preservation System in Pub. L. No. 93622, 88 Stat. 2096 (1974).
66 The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment states: "[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'T See generally, MacLeod & Means, supra note 61, at 7-7 and 7-13.
68 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
69 Ct. Cl. No. 83-79L.
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the wilderness area boundaries, the government's "denial of access ... would
constitute a compensable taking. 70 An "unambiguous, unequivocal and final"
determination by OSM or by the United States Forest Service of the company's "valid existing rights" (VER) under section 522(e) was necessary even
though "the combined impact of the Wilderness Acts and [the Surface Mine
Act] clearly reduces both Otter Creek's possibilities of access to its mineral
reserves and the government's discretion to permit such access to a narrow
residuum. 71 A possibility of mining would exist if the company were found to
possess VER.
The dispute started on June 20, 1980, when the Court of Claims directed
the company to file applications with the Departments of Agriculture and Interior to determine if the agencies would permit mining within the wilderness
area. In the present action, the judge found that the result of the application
process was ambiguous. Both departments had interpreted the June 20 order
as requiring a full permit application, but Otter Creek Coal Co. had submitted
only a mining plan.72 At the end of the application process, the government
and the company disagreed on the company's options. Most of the coal owned
by Otter Creek could be mined underground from areas outside the wilderness
area, the government argued. And, it suggested that for non-mineable areas it
may consider an exchange of non-wilderness area land for those mineral rights
owned by Otter Creek. The Company countered by claiming that the government's plans were uneconomical, technically impossible or would violate environmental regulations.
Judge Seto noted that the "totality of the circumstances" would be considered on a case-by-case basis in reaching a determination on VER. "Presumably, such factors as the impossibility and impracticability of mining from locations outside wilderness boundaries could be considered in such a case-by-case
determination." 73
If the company is found to have VER it must submit complete permit
applications, which are necessary to obtain a "special use permit" for mining
within the wilderness area as prescribed by the Department of Agriculture, and
for complying with the Department of Interior's regulations governing mining
within a designated wilderness area. Additionally,
the judge ordered Otter
74
Creek to file progress reports every six months.
V.

INSPECTIONS: DISPLAY OF CREDENTIALS

A federal district court has ruled that inspections may be undertaken
without a prior display of credentials if "extraordinary" circumstances
necessitate.

"' Id. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
71

Ct. Cl. No. 83-79L.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74 Id.
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In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Watt,75 an OSM inspector observed water
flowing in a ditch approximately 10 minutes (in travel time by vehicle) from
the mine office. The inspector, who had identified himself upon arrival but had
failed to show his credentials, returned to his truck for equipment to gather a
water sample; however, the water dissipated.
The inspector returned unannounced 12 days later with two other inspectors. He went straight to the ditch, obtained the water sample and then identified himself. A notice of violation (NOV) 6 was issued based upon the water
analysis.
An administrative law judge found that Consol's superintendent had
radioed employees to shut down the pump while the inspector collected his
equipment. While admitting the violation, the company argued that the NOV
should be invalid because the, inspector, on his second visit, had entered the
property "without notifying anyone of his presence and without presenting appropriate credentials to anyone. '2' 7 The ALJ rejected these protests with the
broad ruling that the second inspection was an extension of the first, and that
"a right of entry once established continues a reasonable length of time with78
out the need for renewal or reestablishment."
The Interior Board of Surface Mining and Reclamation Appeals rejected
the continuing right-of-entry holding. Instead, it found that an exemption was
possible if extraordinary circumstances existed, such as where "presentation of
credentials would be tantamount to advance notice."'
On remand, the ALJ
determined that extraordinary circumstances did exist to justify the entry
without presenting credentials. The particular circumstance noted was the "instant communications network" at the minesite which enabled the water to be
shut off in five minutes, while it took the inspector 10 minutes to reach the
ditch.
The district court upheld the Board's construction and interpretation of
the Act, citing 'the latitude8" it enjoys and its expertise and practical experience.81 While normally, under 30 C.F.R. section 721.12(a), a mine owner is entitled to know who has entered his property, some inspections may be made
without advance notice, the court ruled. But that subsection also provides for
inspections without notice because "insistence on presentation of credentials in
every situation would render the 'without advance notice' language virtually
meaningless if a mine could remedy or cover a violation between the time the
inspector presented his credentials and [the time he] arrived at the inspection
site. ' ' 8l The court concluded that the Board's interpretation accommodates the
71 No. 80-3037 (S.D. IMI., Feb. 8, 1982).

The NOV was for a violation of suspended solids limitation. See 30 C.F.R. § 715.17 (1982).
Id. See 30 C.F.R. § 721.12(a) (1982).
78 No. 80-3037 (S.D. IMI., Feb. 8, 1982).
79 Id.
80 Id. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301, 1309 (D.D.C. 1978).
81 No. 80-3037 (S.D. IM., Feb. 8, 1982). See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S.
112, 134-35 (1977).
82 No. 80-3037 (S.D. Ill., Feb. 8, 1982).
76

7
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competing requirements of credential presentation and inspections without advance notice.
Another argument advanced by the company was that 30 C.F.R. section
721.12(a) violated the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment.8 3
The judge rejected this argument with reliance on a Supreme Court decision
and a Seventh Circuit ruling. In 1981, the Supreme Court in Donovan v.
Dewey 84 held that warrantless searches under section 103(a) 85 of the Federal
Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977 do not violate the fourth amendment since
they were reasonable. Furthermore, the Court held (1) that a warrant may not
be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that
warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the regulatory presence is such that the owner of commercial property cannot help but
be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections," (2) that in
view of the substantial federal interest in improving health and safety conditions in the mines and Congress' awareness of the mining industry's poor
health and safety record, it could reasonably determine that a system of warrantless inspections was necessary if the law is to be properly enforced and
inspections made effective,8 7 and (3) that the certainty and regularity of the
application of the statute's inspection program provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. 88
Moreover, the court found that Donovan supported the decision in Andrus
v. P-Burg Coal Co.,89 a circuit court decision which upheld the constitutionality of warrantless searches under the Surface Mining Act.
VI.

PREEMPTION

At least two cases dealt with the issue of preemption by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
In Ginn v. Consolidation Coal Co.,90 a nearby resident had filed suit in a
circuit court in Illinois, claiming that defendant's blasting with excessively
heavy charges of explosives caused structural damage to his dwelling. Consol
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the Act and its regulations
preempted the state court's jurisdiction. The trial court accepted that argument and dismissed the complaint.91 The plaintiff then complained to the Federal Office of Surface Mining. An inspection was made and a notice of violation
issued. Unsatisfied with that action, the plaintiff filed suit in the Appellate
Court of Illinois, Fifth District.
The court first addressed the question of whether the Act had preempted
83

Id.

- 452 U.S. 594 (1981).

30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
18 452 U.S. at 598-602.
Id. at 602-03.
-8 Id. at 603-04.

87

s' 644 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1981).
" 107 IMI.App. 3d 564, 437 N.E.2d 793 (1982).
" 437 N.E.2d at 794.
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the common law jurisdiction of state courts and thus provided the exclusive
remedy for the plaintiff.92 It noted that federal law preempts"3 state law when
the latter "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."" Furthermore, courts will not find
preemption unless Congress expresses an intention to do so, the state action
directly confficts with a federal law or federal scheme, or it appears from the
totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to exclude state laws on the
same subject. 5
The defendant coal company argued first that the purposes and regulations of the Surface Mining Act are so comprehensive that they should exclude
state common law actions for damages caused by explosives used in mining
operations. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that neither the history
nor the purposes of the Act suggest an intent by Congress to extinguish state
common law liability for such damages." A reference to "comprehensiveness"
7
did not help defendant's argument.
Secondly, Consol urged the court to infer an intent to preempt from
section 1270(f)'s8 provision for a civil action for damages resulting from violations of any rule, regulation, order or permit issued under the Act. Again, the
court rejected the defendant's argument.9 It stressed that the "savings clause"
in subsection 1270(e) provides, in part, that "nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person may have under any statute or common
law...

"

o

Another basis for the court's decision was that state and federal remedies
should be viewed with an eye toward the express purposes of the Act, one of
which is to protect the rights of surface landowners. 10 1 Individuals alleging
damages must establish an injury resulting from a violation of a rule or regulation under the Act.102 Under Illinois law, a more liberal standard is employed:
common law civil liability for blasting operations is governed by the doctrine of
strict liability and requires merely a showing of a causal connection between
the alleged damage and the use of explosives.1 08 The court found that imposition of tort liability on the basis of the more stringent state law was consistent
with the federal law's purposes. 104
The second issue before the Ginn court was whether the plaintiff's failure
Id. at 795.
IsSupremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI.
92

437 N.E.2d at 795 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
"1Id. (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
94

" See H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD.NEws 593; 30 U.S.C. § 1202.
#7See Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., 42 IML App. 3d 330, 340-42, 355 N.E.2d 686, 694-95 (1976).
9 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
99 437 N.E.2d at 795.
100

30 U.S.C. § 1270(e) (Supp. IV 1980).

101 30

U.S.C. § 1202(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
103 Peet v. Dolese & Shepard & Co., 41 I. App. 2d 358, 368, 190 N.E.2d 613, 618 (1963).
,04
437 N.E.2d at 796.
102
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to exhaust available administrative remedies precluded his action. 105 The act
does not expressly require a party to pursue administrative remedies before
proceeding to court to obtain common law remedies. 1°' Furthermore, exhaustion of administrative remedies is required only in situations where a party
seeks judicial review of an administrative action. 10 7 Here, plaintiff's complaint
to the Federal Office of Surface Mining and the resulting NOV were not administrative determinations by which he had been "aggrieved." 10 8 Therefore,
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required.
In a second preemption case, Wiggins v. Brazil Coal and Clay Corp.,109
property owners in Sugar Ridge Lake Estates brought a suit alleging that the
surface mining activities of Brazil Coal caused the loss of water in the lake in
their subdivision.
The plaintiffs had raised section 717110 of the Act to support their claim
for damages and injunctive relief. That section provides that an operator must
replace a property owner's water supply when it has been affected by contamination, diminution or interruption proximately resulting from the surface coal
mine operation.111 The trial judge ruled that he had no jurisdiction to enforce
the provision and that Brazil Coal's pumping and removal of water in relation
to its mining operations was reasonable and necessary.1 2 The court therefore
denied the requested relief.
Indiana's Court of Appeals, First District, reversed, holding that the principle of preemption and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 1 s would not allow the common law of Indiana to be extended so as to
contradict federal law.114 Affirming the trial court's decision would elicit that
result. The court relied on the 1981 United States Supreme Court decision in
Hodel v. Indiana,' 5 in which Indiana challenged the Surface Mining Act's
prime farmland provision, as well as'other land restoration provisions, as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, 1 6 the guarantees of due process
and equal protection 12 and the Tenth Amendment. 8
105 Id.

10 Id.
107

Strom Int'l, Ltd. v. Spar Warehouse & Distributors, Inc., 69 II. App. 3d 696, 388 N.E.2d

108 (1979).
1"

437 N.E.2d at 796.
N.E. 2d 495 (Ind. 1982).
30 U.S.C. § 1307 (Supp. IV 1980).

109 440

11
12

Id.

112 440 N.E.2d at 497.
"' This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-

ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CO.NST. art. VI, cl. 2.
114 440 N.E.2d at 499.
I's 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
.16U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
117 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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In Hodel, the Court reversed a district court decision, 119 and held that the
land reclamation provisions were a valid exercise of Congress' power pursuant
to the Commerce Clause to ensure that coal production would not be at the
120
expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety.
VII. RECLAMATION

FEES AND BANKRUPTCY

A federal bankruptcy judge recently ruled that fees due and owing under
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act121 are taxes not subject to
discharge in bankruptcy.
In In re King (U.S. v. King)12 2 two brothers doing business as an excavating company filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions in 1980. In 1981 the United
States filed complaints seeking a determination of the dischargeability of defendants' debts to the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund.1 21 A total of
$16,728.69 in delinquent fees with interest at the rate of 1 percent per month
commencing 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter for which fees were
due 124 was alleged to be owed.

The defendants argued that the reclamation fee is not a "tax" since the
Act does not specifically refer to the abandoned mine reclamation fee as a
"tax." Therefore, they contended, the "fees" they owed should be dischargeable since the Bankruptcy Code125 only excepts from discharge any debt for a
12
"tax" of a kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(6). 1
Conversely, the United States contended that the use of the word "fee" in
the reclamation fee section 12 7 should not be used to conclusively determine
that the required payments do not constitute "taxes" for bankruptcy

28

purposes.
The court relied on National Cable Television Ass'n., Inc. v. United
States,12 9 for a distinction1 0 between fees and taxes. Judge Clive W. Bare com",

U.S. CONST.

amend. X.

8 Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980).
120 452 U.S. 314, 324-29.

12130 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (Supp IV 1980). See infra note 153.
122 19 Bankr. 936 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
:23

Id. at 936.

,4 30 C.F.R. § 870.15(d) (1982).
12 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
126 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
2
'28

30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6), § 523(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).

415 U.S. 336 (1974).
Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which is the sole organ for levying
taxes, may act arbitrarily and disregard benefits bestowed by the government on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay, based on property or income. A fee, however, is
incident to a voluntary act, e.g., a request that a public agency permit an applicant to
practice law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast station. The public
agency performing those services normally may exact a fee for a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other members of the society.
415 U.S. at 342.
129
130
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pared the case at bar with In re Pan American PaperMills, Inc., 311 in which
the court found that "premiums" assessed under a workmen's compensation
act had "tax" characteristics and therefore should be treated as taxes under
the Bankruptcy Act.132 The premiums were "pecuniary obligations imposed by
the government for the purpose of defraying the expenses of an undertaking
which it authorized. '" 3
The "undertaking" (the Workmen's Compensation Act) in Pan American
and the "undertaking" in the Surface Mining Act were similar, the court
found. To protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations,"' Congress placed a pecuniary obligation. upon
individuals' property, regardless of their consent, for the purpose of defraying
an undertaking authorized by the government.
Consequently, the mining reclamation fee constitutes a tax for bankruptcy"3 purposes under the Supreme Court's definition in United States v.
New York." 8 As the government 3had
argued, calling the funds owing "fees" in
7
the statute is not determinative.

Additionally, the judge agreed with the United States that the reclamation
fee is an "excise tax"'' 3 8 and not a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts, a property tax, a customs duty, an employment tax or a tax required to
be collected or withheld. 3 9 Relying on previous Supreme Court and bankruptcy decisions,"10 the court found that "excise tax" had been given a very
broad definition, including "a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or
the exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership""' and
"any tax that is not a direct tax.' 42 In applying these definitions to the instant
case, the court held that the reclamation fee is imposed upon a particular use
of property or the exercise of a single power over the property incidental to
ownership, "i.e. the removal of coal from land." Therefore, it is an "excise tax"
that is 3 excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code.

131 618

F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1980).

U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (repealed 1979).

132

11

133

618 F.2d at 162.

1- 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
.35 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
136

315 U.S. 510 (1942).

United States v. King (In re King) 19 Bankr. 936, 939 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
,38 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(E) (Supp. IV 1980).
139 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(A)-(D) (Supp. IV 1980).
1I Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929); In re Beaman, 9 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. D. Or.
137

1980).
" Bromley, 280 U.S. at 136.
142Beaman,

9 Bankr. at 541 (citing Steward v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1936)).

143 19 Bankr. at 939.
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VIII.

A.

APPLICABILITY OF THE ACT

"Surface Coal Mining Operations"

14
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky 4
reversed a decision by the Interior Board of Surface Mining and Reclamation
Appeals that a tipple twenty-five miles from the nearest mine is not a "surface
coal mining operation"1 45 and therefore is not subject to the Act's jurisdiction.
A notice of violation (NOV) had been issued to Dinco Coal Sales for operating a tipple within 300 feet of occupied dwellings without permission. The
Interior Board's administrative law judge, in dismissing the NOV, ruled that
the tipple was not operated "in connection with" a coal mine subject to the
Act, nor "at or near" the mining site. The Board affirmed the finding, but only
on the grounds that the "at or near" language precluded jurisdiction by the
OSM.
The Secretary argued that the "at or near" the mine site language was
controlling, while the citizens appealing the lower rulings argued that the key
language was "inconnection with." The court agreed with the citizens and
ruled that the Secretary had jurisdiction to regulate the operations involved.
Support for the ruling was found in the Secretary's determination that the
tipple was operating "in connection with" mines, in the 1981 Shawnee Coal

Co. v. Andrus 46 case and in a reading of the relevant section

4

7

of the Act.

Appeals in the case were filed in October and November in the Sixth Circuit.
144 Mary

Debord v. Dinco Sales, No. 82-99 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 23, 1982).
"Surface coal mining operation" is defined in 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) as:
(A) activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a surface coal
mine or subject to the requirements of section 1266 of this title surface operations and
surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine, the products of which enter commerce or the operations of which directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce. Such
activities include excavation for the purpose of obtaining coal including such common
methods as contour, strip, auger, mountaintop removal, box cut, open pit, and area mining, the uses of explosives and blasting, and in situ distillation or retorting, leaching or
other chemical or physical processing, and the cleaning, concentrating, or other processing or preparation, loading of coal for interstate commerce at or near the mine site: Provided, however, That such activities do not include the extraction of coal incidental to
the extraction of other minerals where coal does not exceed 16% per centum of the tonnage of minerals removed for purposes of commercial use or sale or coal explorations
subject to section 1262 of this title; and
(B) the areas upon which such activities occur or where such activities disturb the
natural land surface. Such areas shall also include any adjacent land the use of which is
incidental to any such activities, all lands affected by the construction of new roads or
the improvement or use of existing roads to gain access to the site of such activities and
for haulage, and excavations, workings, impoundments, dams, ventilation shafts, entryways, refuse banks, dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles, spoil banks, culm banks, tailings, holes or depressions, repair areas, storage areas, processing areas, shipping areas
and other areas upon which are sited structures, facilities, or other property or materials
on the surface, resulting from or incident to such activities.
I's661 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1981). The case interpreted the statute to encompass off-site
processing operations, such as tippling, and finding that "Congress intended for tippling operations
to fall within the Act's ambit." Id. at 1094.
147 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) (Supp. IV 1980).
45
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"Second Mining" Operations

Reclaimed coal means coal from a deposit that is not in its original geological location, such as refuse piles or culm banks or retaining dams and ponds
that are or have been used during the mining or preparation process and
1 This process is known as "second mining," "bank
stream coal deposits. 147
1
1' 4 8
mining," "re-mining," or "refuse mining.
Anthracite

silt/19

removed, scalp screened 8 0 and loaded by corporations

engaged in its removal from silt dams was held to be "coal" within the meaning of the Act in a decision by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.8 1 Additionally, the two companies involved were held
to be engaged in "surface coal mining" and were held to be "operators of coal
mining operations. 1 ' 52 Consequently, the companies
were held liable under the
15
Act for Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund fees. 3
Devil's Hole, Incorporated and Hecla Mining and Machinery Company
sold anthracite silt from silt dams to an electric plant,15 which used it in coalfired steam generators. The anthracite silt was introduced into the stream boilers to generate electricity in combination with prepared anthracite since the
power plants' boilers required this combination.
Although both companies had obtained permits from the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources and had filed forms with the Office of
Surface Mining of the Department of the Interior acknowledging that they
were mining anthracite coal, neither
had paid reclamation fund fees for the
155
anthracite silt they had removed.
In finding that the removal of silt was a "surface coal mining operation,"
the court noted that Congress evidenced an intent that the statute 5 6 be interpreted broadly by providing a broad definition of the type of operations subject to the fee. 157 The definition of "surface coal mining operations," the court
found, includes not only traditional mining activity, but also methods of exFed. Reg. 870.5.
United States v. Devil's Hole, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
1" Anthracite silt is the residue matter following the wet washing of freshly mined coal or
processed coal at the mine site. This residue is slushed into silt dams. 548 F. Supp. at 452.
147.-147
141

150 Scalp screening involves passing anthracite silt over a screen to remove only large rocks,
tree limbs and other large debris. 548 F. Supp. at 452.
151 Id. at 455.
152 Id. at 456.

153 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) provides:
All operators of coal mining operations subject to the provisions of this chapter shall pay
to the Secretary of the Interior, for deposit in the fund, a reclamation fee of 35 cents per
ton of coal produced by surface coal mining and 15 cents per ton of coal produced by
underground mining or 10 per centum of the value of the coal at the mine, as determined
by the Secretary, whichever is less, except that the reclamation fee for lignite coal shall
be at a rate of 2 per centum of the value of the coal at the mine, or 10 cents per ton,
whichever is less.
14 548 F. Supp. at 452-53.
155 Id.

30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
117 548 F. Supp. at 455.

106
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tracting coal that are not traditionally considered mining, such as in situ distillation or retorting. 155 And, the Act's definition specifically includes silt banks
(or culm banks) like those involved in this case.1" '
Judge Huyett made the finding that anthracite silt is coal despite testimony that if an order for coal is placed, the companies could not satisfy the
order by delivering silt. He rationalized his finding by contending that "coal"
has both a limited and general meaning in the industry. "In the limited sense,
coal as used in the hypothetical order means pure coal. However, it is clear
that the defendants [the power plant], when speaking of coal generally, include
anthracite silt.''16°
In addition to his reliance on Congressional intent, the judge pointed to
expert testimony and factual evidence on how the silt banks were produced
and how the silt was removed. 161 Also, regulations issued on June 30, 1982,
define "reclaimed coal" and state that its production is "surface coal mining
operations" for fee liability and calculation purposes. 62
C.

"Operator" and "Strip Mining Operation"

The Ohio Supreme Court recently ruled that one who removes coal while
preparing a site for commercial development is subject to permit requirements
of statutes governing reclamation of strip-mined land.
The appellees in State ex rel. Brown v. Home Pro Enterprises, Inc.1 63
were commercial developers who, before applying for a strip mining permit,""
had never encountered, removed, marketed or otherwise dealt with coal. Home
Pro had commenced operations on the site before the permit was approved,
uncovering a 2,500 ton seam of coal. It stockpiled approximately 300 tons of
coal on the site.
Under the applicable Ohio statute,1 65 the appellees would be subject to
permit requirements if they were "operators""" and if their activity was a
"strip mining operation. '' 16 7 The court found that since the company had removed more than 250 tons of coal within a twelve-month period, it was an
"operator" under the Ohio statute.
The next issue, then, was whether the company had "engaged in strip
1I8
Id.
59 Id. See 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
:so548 F. Supp. at 455.
161 Id. at 454-56.
162 Reclaimed coal means coal recovered from a deposit that is not in its original geological
location, such as refuse piles or culm banks or retaining dams and ponds that are or have been
used during the mining or preparation process, and steam coal deposits. Reclaimed coal operations
are considered to be surface coal mining operations for fee liability and calculation purposes. See
30 C.F.R. § 870.5 (1981).
163 1 Ohio St. 3d 255, 438 N.E.2d 1175 (1982).
I4 Pursuant to OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1513.07(A) (Supp. 1982).
161

"6

Id.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1513.01(G) (Supp. 1982).
§ 1513.01 (F) and (Supp. 1982).

'67 OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
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mining." Home Pro, even though it was engaged in strip mining only on an
occasional basis, was held to be "engaged in strip mining."'"" The General Assembly chose to regulate those engaged in strip mining-"not just those engaged in the business of strip mining," the court noted.16 9
On the final issue of whether the company was conducting a "strip mining
operation," the court of appeals had reasoned that since the removal of coal
was incidental to commercial development, it was not a strip mining operation.
In reaching its conclusion, that court had relied on the fact that the statute 70
was directed toward "reclamation" and that Home Pro was instead commercially developing the site.
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected that argument, noting that the statutes' 7 ' do not exempt from regulation commercial developers who incidentally
remove coal. Further, in examining the goals and purposes of Ohio's statutory
scheme, it noted that, "It would undermine the purposes of the statutory
scheme by allowing a class of people to remove coal in a manner that could be
environmentally harmful."' 72
The court ruled 5-2 to subject the company to Ohio's Surface Mining
Act. 173
IX.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE

ACT

The District of Columbia District Court, in Save Our CumberlandMountains v. Watt, 7 4 was faced with the question of whether assessment of penalties for cessation orders' 75 is mandatory or discretionary with the Secretary of
the Interior.
Plaintiffs claimed that officials had failed to assess and collect mandatory
civil penalties and to take enforcement actions against surface coal mine operators who had been found in violation of the Surface Mining Act.77 The officials
(the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement) asserted that imposition of penalties is discretionary and that therefore the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which
77
relief could be granted.
In reaching its conclusion that the Secretary has a mandatory duty to impose the penalties, 75 the court first looked to the enforcement section 7 9 of the
1 Ohio St. 3d at 257, 438 N.E.2d at 1177.
Id.
170 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 1513 (Supp. 1982).
17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 1513, 1514 (Supp. 1982).
168

169

171 1 Ohio St. 3d at 258, 438 N.E.2d at 1178.
173

Id.

17, 550 F. Supp. 979 (D. D.C. 1982).

30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
The facts in this case and the venue issue are set forth in the text accompanying notes 4148, supra.
177 550 F. Supp. at 980.
275
176

171

Id. at 983.

176

30 U.S.C. § 1271 (Supp. IV 1980).
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Act. When the Secretary has reason to believe that a mining operation contains
a serious violation of the Act, he must immediately order cessation of mining
activities.180 If, however, the violation does not create an imminent danger to
the public or to the environment, then the Secretary must issue a notice of
violation fixing a reasonable time for abatement of the condition."8 " If the mine
operator fails to abate the condition within the specified time, the Secretary
"shall immediately order a cessation of surface coal mining and reclamation
82
operations on the portions thereof relevant to the violation."1
The issue before the court was based on the civil penalties that follow the
issuance of a "failure-to-abate" cessation order. Interpreting the penalties sec84
tion,1 83 the court emphasized that the word "shall" in both section 518(a)1
85
86
and in section 518(h)
suggests that it is mandatory. However, the government argued that assessment of penalties for failure-to-abate cessation orders
is discretionary and urged the court to view the statutory scheme "as a
whole.' 18 7 It argued that prosecutorial discretion in other administrative
processes suggests a similar discretion in the area of penalty assessment.
The court rejected the government's contentions and reasoned that nothing in the administrative review procedures permits the Secretary to not assess
a penalty upon an operator who receives a failure-to-abate cessation order. The
possibility of an adverse outcome upon review cannot be "an excuse for failing
to take the first step in the required penalty process." 8 8
The Secretary's motion for reconsideration of the ruling was denied three
months later.8 9 Additionally, the court issued an order requiring the Secretary
to take specific steps in assessing and collecting penalties. "[I]n light of the
Secretary's three-year disregard for the statute and regulations," injunctive relief was necessary to ensure that the Secretary does not resume his "flouting"
of section 518(h). 90°
Rebecca L. Stepto

18030 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
181 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
182Id.

18330 U.S.C. § 1268 (Supp. IV 1980).
18430 U.S.C. § 1268(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
185

30 U.S.C. § 1268(h) (Supp. IV 1980).

550 F. Supp. at 982. See, e.g., Association of American Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310,
1312 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
286

187 550 F. Supp. at 982.

188 Id.
188 Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Watt, No. 81-2134 (D. D.C., Dec. 28, 1982).
190Id. See also 30 U.S.C. § 1268 (h) (Supp. IV 1980).
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